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1.	The	puzzle	
	
Here’s	a	well-known	puzzle,	the	puzzle	of	the	ship	of	Theseus.	We	start	with	a	ship	at	
location	A.	We	replace	each	of	its	planks	one-by-one,	moving	the	old	planks	to	location	
B	 as	we	proceed.	 Eventually	we	 replace	 all	 of	 the	 planks,	 so	 that	 the	 ship	 has	 been	
totally	refurbished.	But	then	we	assemble	the	planks	at	location	B	into	a	ship,	so	that	
there	are	two	ships	–	the	ship	that	we	started	with,	at	location	A,	and	the	ship	that	we	
have	 just	built,	at	 location	B.	But	why	not	think	that	 the	ship	that	we	started	with	 is	
now	at	location	B,	having	been	dismantled	and	moved,	and	that	the	ship	at	location	A	
is	a	new	ship,	one	that	we	have	built	where	the	original	ship	used	to	be?	These	seem	
to	be	two	equally	good	ways	to	think	about	what	we	have	done.	So	which	of	the	two	
ships	(if	either)	is	the	original	ship,	and	why?	That’s	the	puzzle.	
	
2.	A	new	solution	
	
In	describing	the	puzzle	in	this	way	I	am	assuming	various	things:	that	there	is	a	ship	at	
the	start	of	the	process;	that	the	ship	has	planks	as	parts;	that	the	ship	can	lose	these	
planks;	 that	 the	 ship	 can	 gain	new	planks;	 that	 the	 ship	 can	have	a	plank	detached,	
moved	 and	 re-attached,	 all	 the	while	 staying	 part	 of	 the	 ship;	 that	 the	 ship	 can	 be	
totally	 refurbished	 (i.e.	 have	 all	 of	 its	 planks	 replaced);	 and	 that	 the	 ship	 can	 be	
disassembled	and	relocated.	Various	attempts	have	been	made	to	solve	or	dissolve	the	
puzzle	by	arguing	that	one	or	more	of	these	assumptions	is	false.	I	want	to	propose	a	
new	 solution,	 one	 that	 allows	 each	 of	 these	 assumptions	 to	 be	 true.	 I’m	 not	 sure	
whether	it	is	the	right	solution,	but	I’m	pretty	sure	that	it’s	worth	taking	seriously.	
	
3.	Changing	the	question	
	
Our	aim	is	to	answer	the	following	question:	At	the	end	of	the	process,	which	of	the	
two	ships	(if	either)	is	the	original	ship?	
	
I	 suggest	 that	we	 switch	 to	 a	 slightly	 different	 question:	 At	 the	 end	 of	 the	 process,	
where	(if	anywhere)	is	the	original	ship?	
	
If	we	can	answer	this	second	question	then	we	can	answer	the	first.	 If,	at	the	end	of	
the	process,	the	original	ship	is	at	location	A	then,	at	the	end	of	the	process,	the	ship	at	
location	 A	 is	 the	 original	 ship.	 If,	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 process,	 the	 original	 ship	 is	 at	
location	B	then,	at	the	end	of	the	process,	the	ship	at	location	B	is	the	original	ship.	If,	
at	the	end	of	the	process,	the	original	ship	is	somewhere	other	than	at	location	A	or	B	
(or	is	nowhere)	then,	at	the	end	of	the	process,	neither	the	ship	at	location	A	nor	the	
ship	at	location	B	is	the	original	ship.	
	
There	is	an	easy	answer	to	this	second	question:	At	the	end	of	the	process	the	original	
ship	is	wherever	its	planks	are.	If	its	planks	are	all	at	location	A	then	the	original	ship	is	
at	location	A.	If	its	planks	are	all	at	location	B	then	the	original	ship	is	at	location	B.	If	
some	of	its	planks	are	at	location	A	and	some	are	at	location	B	then	the	original	ship	is	
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partly	at	location	A	and	partly	at	location	B.	If	it	has	no	planks	then	the	original	ship	is	
nowhere	(it	might	not	even	exist).	
	
But	this	answer	raises	another	question:	At	the	end	of	the	process,	which	planks	are	
the	original	ship’s	planks?	This	is	not	so	easy	to	answer.	It's	clear	where	all	the	planks	
are	then,	but	it’s	not	clear	which	of	them	belong	to	the	original	ship.	At	the	start	of	the	
process	it	is	all	and	only	the	planks	at	location	A	that	belong	to	the	original	ship.	But	at	
the	end	of	the	process	it	might	not	be	these	planks	–	we	are	allowing	that	the	original	
ship	can	gain	and	lose	planks.	Things	might	change	during	each	step	of	the	process,	in	
which	a	plank	at	location	A	is	moved	to	location	B,	or	in	which	a	new	plank	is	moved	to	
location	A.	
	
So	what	we	need	to	know	is	this:	When	a	plank	is	moved	from	location	A	to	location	B	
is	it	still	a	part	of	the	original	ship?	And	when	a	new	plank	is	moved	to	location	A	does	
it	become	a	part	of	the	original	ship?	If	we	know	the	answers	to	these	questions	then	
we	 know	 which	 planks	 belong	 to	 the	 original	 ship	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 process,	 and	
thereby	know	where	the	original	ship	is	at	the	end	of	the	process,	and	thereby	know	
which	of	the	two	ships	at	the	end	of	the	process	is	the	original	ship.		
	
These	questions	are	just	as	hard	to	answer	as	our	original	question.	Consider	when	a	
plank	gets	moved	from	location	A	to	 location	B.	There	are	two	equally	good	ways	of	
thinking	about	what	happens.	Either:	the	plank	is	removed	from	the	original	ship	(i.e.	
stops	from	being	a	part	of	it)	and	is	discarded	to	location	B.	Or:	the	plank	is	still	a	part	
of	 the	 original	 ship	 but	 is	 detached	 and	 moved.	 Similarly	 for	 when	 a	 new	 plank	 is	
moved	 to	 location	 A	 –	 there	 are	 two	 equally	 good	 ways	 of	 thinking	 about	 what	
happens.	Either:	the	plank	is	added	to	the	original	ship	(i.e.	starts	being	a	part	of	it).	Or:	
the	plank	is	still	not	a	part	of	the	original	ship.	
	
What	determines	which	it	is?	Unfortunately	it	is	not	the	position	and	movement	of	the	
planks.	 That	 would	 be	 nice	 and	 simple,	 and	 also	 clear:	 we	 know	 the	 position	 and	
movement	of	the	planks	at	all	times.	But	when	a	plank	gets	moved	from	location	A	to	
location	B	whether	or	not	it	 is	still	a	part	of	the	original	ship	is	not	determined	by	its	
position	and	movement	–	its	position	and	movement	are	compatible	with	both	(a)	the	
plank	being	removed	as	a	part	and	discarded	to	location	B,	and	(b)	the	plank	remaining	
a	part	and	being	moved	to	location	B.	And	when	a	new	plank	is	moved	to	location	A	
whether	or	not	it	becomes	a	part	of	the	original	ship	is	not	determined	by	its	position	
and	movement	–	 its	position	and	movement	are	 compatible	with	both	 (a)	 the	plank	
becoming	 a	 part	 of	 the	 original	 ship,	 and	 (b)	 the	 plank	 not	 becoming	 a	 part	 of	 the	
original	ship.	
	
So	what	does?	I’ll	now	propose	an	answer.	
	
4.	Imparting	and	exparting	
	
We	are	allowing	that	things	can	gain	parts:	 it	 is	possible	for	there	to	be	x	and	y	such	
that	at	some	time	x	is	not	a	part	of	y	but	at	some	later	time	x	is	a	part	of	y.	When	this	
happens	 let’s	 say	 that	 there	 has	 been	 an	 imparting.	 So	 an	 imparting	 occurs	 when	
something	x	which	is	not	a	part	of	something	y	becomes	a	part	of	y.	We	might	also	say	
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that	x	is	imparted	to	y.	So,	for	x	to	be	imparted	to	y	is	for	x	to	change	from	not	being	a	
part	of	y	to	being	a	part	of	y	(this	is	not	especially	a	change	to	x).		
	
We	are	also	allowing	that	 things	can	 lose	parts:	 it	 is	possible	 for	 there	 to	be	x	and	y	
such	that	at	some	time	x	is	a	part	of	y	but	at	some	later	time	x	is	not	a	part	of	y.	When	
this	happens	let’s	say	that	there	has	been	an	exparting.	So	an	exparting	occurs	when	
something	x	which	is	a	part	of	something	y	becomes	not	a	part	of	y.	We	might	also	say	
that	x	is	exparted	from	y.	So,	for	x	to	exparted	from	y	is	for	x	to	change	from	being	a	
part	of	y	to	not	being	a	part	of	y	(again,	this	is	not	especially	a	change	to	y).	
	
I’ve	introduced	two	new	terms:	‘imparting’	and	‘exparting’.	As	far	as	I	can	see	we	don’t	
already	have	words	for	imparting	and	exparting.	We	have	phrases	such	as	‘x	becomes	
a	part	of	y’,	and	‘x	stops	being	a	part	of	y’	(these	are	the	best	natural	phrases	that	I	can	
come	up	with).	But	I’d	rather	not	use	such	long-winded	phrases,	especially	when	they	
are	cumbersome	(as	the	second	one	is).	It	will	be	better	to	have	a	new	term	for	each.	
	
The	 question	 I	 want	 to	 answer	 is	 this:	 What	 does	 it	 take	 for	 an	 imparting	 or	 an	
exparting	to	occur?	
	
Note	 that	 I	 am	 not	 looking	 for	 an	 account	 of	 what	 parthood	 is	 –	 of	 what	 it	 is	 for	
something	 x	 to	 be	 a	 part	 of	 something	 y.	 Nor	 am	 I	 looking	 for	 an	 account	 of	 what	
imparting	and	exparting	are	(I	have	defined	them	above).	I	am	looking	for	an	account	
of	what	it	takes	for	an	imparting	or	exparting	to	occur.		
	
My	 key	 proposal	 is	 that	 impartings	 and	 expartings	 are	 mind-dependent,	 in	 the	
following	sense:	
	
Impartings	and	expartings	require	someone	to	be	in	an	appropriate	mental	state	
	
(I’ll	make	this	more	precise	below.)	
	
At	 least,	 I	 make	 this	 proposal	 for	 impartings	 to	 and	 expartings	 from	 things	 such	 as	
ships,	bicycles,	cars,	chairs,	buildings,	bridges,	and	so	on.	I	do	not	make	it	for	animals,	
trees,	planets,	and	so	on	(at	least	not	in	this	paper).	I’m	not	sure	how	to	draw	a	sharp	
line	between	the	things	to	which	 I	 intend	 it	to	apply	and	the	things	to	which	 I	don’t.	
Using	‘person-made’	doesn’t	work	–	babies	are	person	made.	I’ll	just	call	them	artifacts	
(this	might	not	be	the	right	word	to	use).	
	
I	can	be	more	precise.	For	definiteness	I	will	take	the	appropriate	mental	state	to	be	a	
decision.	Perhaps	 it	should	be	an	 intention	–	 I’m	not	entirely	sure.	But	that	wouldn’t	
make	any	significant	difference	to	what	 I	am	going	to	say,	so	 I’ll	 just	proceed	on	the	
assumption	that	it	is	a	decision.	In	the	case	of	imparting	it	is	the	decision	that	x	is	part	
of	y;	in	the	case	of	exparting	it	is	the	decision	that	x	is	not	part	of	y.	So	my	key	proposal	
is:	
	
Necessarily:	for	all	x	and	y:	x	is	imparted	to	y	only	if	there	is	a	z	such	that	z	decides	
that	x	is	part	of	y	
Necessarily:	 for	 all	 x	 and	 y:	 x	 is	 exparted	 from	 y	 only	 if	 there	 is	 a	 z	 such	 that	 z	
decides	that	x	is	not	part	of	y	
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Note	that	these	are	conditions	are	not	circular:	they	give	necessary	conditions	for	x	to	
become	 a	part	of	y	and	 for	x	 to	stop	being	 a	part	of	y	by	appealing	 to	 the	parthood	
relation,	but	there	is	nothing	circular	about	that	(as	there	might	be	if	they	were	giving	
necessary	conditions	for	x	to	be	a	part	of	y	and	for	x	to	not	be	a	part	of	y	by	appealing	
to	the	parthood	relation).	
	
Note	 also	 that	 these	 are	 just	 necessary	 conditions	 –	 they	 are	 not	 sufficient.	 Other	
things	are	required	for	something	to	become	a	part	of	something,	or	for	something	to	
stop	being	a	part	of	something.	I’ll	mention	a	couple.	
	
First,	the	person	who	decides	must	have	the	appropriate	authority	over	both	x	and	y.	I	
can’t	decide	that	your	bell	is	part	of	my	bicycle,	because	I	don’t	have	the	appropriate	
authority	 over	 your	 bell	 (unless	 you	 give	 me	 the	 appropriate	 authority).	 Nor	 can	 I	
decide	 that	 my	 bell	 is	 part	 of	 your	 bicycle,	 because	 I	 don’t	 have	 the	 appropriate	
authority	 over	 your	 bicycle	 (unless	 you	 give	 me	 the	 appropriate	 authority).	 It	 is	 an	
interesting	question	what	 it	 takes	to	have	the	appropriate	authority	over	something,	
but	it	is	a	difficult	one	and	not	one	that	I	will	try	to	answer	here	(I	won’t	need	to).	
	
Second,	there	must	not	be	a	trumping	decision.	Suppose	that	you	and	I	both	have	the	
appropriate	authority	over	a	certain	bell	and	a	certain	bicycle.	Suppose	that	 I	decide	
that	 the	 bell	 is	 part	 of	 the	 bicycle,	 but	 you	 decide	 that	 it	 is	 not,	 and	 your	 decision	
trumps	mine.	Then	the	bell	is	not	imparted	to	the	bicycle,	even	though	someone	(i.e.	
me)	with	the	appropriate	authority	has	decided	that	it	is	part	of	the	bicycle.	Again,	it	is	
an	interesting	question	what	it	takes	for	one	decision	to	trump	another,	but	a	difficult	
one,	and	luckily	not	one	that	I	need	to	try	to	answer	here.		
	
There	 may	 be	 other	 necessary	 conditions.	 Perhaps	 some	 kind	 of	 performance	 is	
needed	–	in	the	case	of	imparting	perhaps	attaching	x	to	y,	or	saying	“x	is	part	of	y”;	in	
the	case	of	exparting	perhaps	detaching	x	from	y,	or	saying	“x	is	no	longer	part	of	y”.	
I’m	not	sure	whether	such	a	performance	is	required	–	I’m	not	asserting	that	it	is,	I’m	
just	suggesting	that	it	might	be.	
	
It	 will	 help	 to	 introduce	 some	 more	 terminology.	 Let	 CI(x,	 y,	 z)	 be	 the	 rest	 of	 the	
conditions	 that	 are	 required	 for	 x	 to	 be	 imparted	 to	 y	 by	 z	 (‘CI’	 for	 ‘conditions	 on	
imparting’),	and	let	CE(x,	y,	z)	be	the	rest	of	the	conditions	that	are	required	for	x	to	be	
exparted	from	y	by	z	(‘CE’	for	‘conditions	on	exparting’).	
	
Then,	 I	 propose,	 we	 have	 the	 following	 necessary	 and	 sufficient	 conditions	 for	 an	
imparting	or	exporting	to	occur:	
		
Necessarily:	for	all	x	and	y:	x	is	imparted	to	y	iff	there	is	a	z	such	that	z	decides	that	x	
is	part	of	y	and	CI(x,	y,	z)	
Necessarily:	for	all	x	and	y:	x	 is	exparted	from	y	iff	there	is	a	z	such	that	z	decides	
that	x	is	not	part	of	y	and	CE(x,	y,	z)	
	
This	doesn’t	 add	all	 that	much.	 It	 just	makes	 it	 clear	 that	 if	 conditions	CI(x,	 y,	 z)	 are	
satisfied	then	whether	or	a	thing	x	is	imparted	to	a	thing	y	comes	down	to	whether	or	
	 5	
not	a	certain	decision	is	made.	Similarly	for	exparting.	I	will	use	this	later	when	I	return	
to	solving	the	puzzle.	
	
5.	A	general	phenomenon	
	
I	 have	 proposed	 that	 impartings	 and	 expartings	 are	 mind-dependent	 changes.	 This	
doesn’t	 make	 them	 particularly	 special	 –	 there	 are	 many	 kinds	 of	 mind-dependent	
change.	Here	are	a	few	examples:	
	
Becoming	a	member	of	a	club	
Becoming	married		
Becoming	named	
Becoming	promised	to	do	something	
	
Each	 of	 these	 changes	 also	 requires	 someone	 to	 be	 in	 an	 appropriate	mental	 state,	
which	we	can	take	to	be	a	decision	(or	perhaps	it	should	be	an	intention).	For	someone	
x	to	become	a	member	of	a	club	y	requires	that	someone	z	decides	that	x	is	a	member	
of	y.	There	are	other	conditions	as	well:	z	must	have	the	appropriate	authority;	there	
must	 not	 be	 a	 trumping	 decision;	 perhaps	 there	 needs	 to	 be	 some	 kind	 of	
performance;	and	so	on.	Similarly	for	the	other	things	on	the	list.	
	
There	is	a	general	phenomenon	here.	My	proposal	is	that	imparting	and	exparting	are	
further	instances	of	this	phenomenon.		
	
There	 are	 many	 interesting	 and	 difficult	 questions	 that	 we	 might	 ask	 about	 this	
phenomenon:	What	 does	 it	 take	 to	 have	 the	 appropriate	 authority?	What	 happens	
when	 there	 is	 a	 clash	 of	 decisions,	 with	 none	 trumping	 the	 rest?	 Is	 some	 kind	 of	
performance	 actually	 required?	 Does	 the	 change	 require,	 for	 its	 persistence,	 the	
persistence	 of	 the	 mental	 state	 that	 was	 involved	 in	 bringing	 it	 about?	 Are	 these	
changes	 actually	 brought	 about,	 or	 is	 it	 just	 community	 belief	 that	 they	 have	 been	
brought	 about	 that	 is	 brought	 about?	 (If	 the	 latter	 then	 this	 might	 explain	 why	 a	
performance	is	required,	if	it	is).	
	
These	 are	 difficult	 questions,	 and	 they	 might	 raise	 deep	 problems.	 But	 any	 such	
problems	are	not	particular	to	imparting	and	exparting	–	they	are	problems	for	all	of	
these	kinds	of	changes.	 Imparting	and	exparting,	as	my	proposals	have	them,	are	no	
more	weird	or	problematic	than	the	many	other	mind-dependent	changes	that	there	
are.	
	
6.	Obvious	counterexamples	
	
I	have	proposed	that:	
	
Necessarily:	for	all	x	and	y:	x	is	imparted	to	y	only	if	there	is	a	z	such	that	z	decides	
that	x	is	part	of	y	
Necessarily:	 for	 all	 x	 and	 y:	 x	 is	 exparted	 from	 y	 only	 if	 there	 is	 a	 z	 such	 that	 z	
decides	that	x	is	not	part	of	y	
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A	counterexample	to	the	first	is	a	possible	situation	in	which	there	is	an	x	and	a	y	such	
that	x	is	imparted	to	y	but	no	one	decides	that	x	is	a	part	of	y.	A	counterexample	to	the	
second	is	a	possible	situation	in	which	there	is	an	x	and	a	y	such	that	x	is	exparted	from	
y	but	no	one	decides	that	x	is	not	a	part	of	y.		
	
It	seems	easy	to	think	of	counterexamples.	Suppose	the	bell	on	my	bicycle	rattles	loose	
and	 falls	down	a	 long	 cliff,	never	 to	be	 seen	again.	Then	 the	bell	has	been	exparted	
from	my	bicycle,	but	no	one	decided	that	 the	bell	 is	not	part	of	my	bicycle.	This	 is	a	
counterexample	to	the	second	proposal.	
	
Well,	perhaps	not.	Is	the	bell	really	no	longer	part	of	my	bicycle?	Why	not	think	that	it	
is	 still	 part	 of	my	 bicycle,	 albeit	 a	 very	 remote	 one?	 It	 is	 no	 good	 to	 appeal	 to	 the	
movement	 and	 position	 of	 the	 bell	 to	 argue	 that	 it	 is	 no	 longer	 part	 of	my	 bicycle.	
Remember	that	we	are	proceeding	on	the	assumption	that	movement	and	position	do	
not	determine	whether	something	x	is	exparted	from	something	y,	and	we	are	looking	
for	something	else	that	determines	it.	So,	to	appeal	to	the	movement	and	position	of	
the	bell	to	argue	that	it	 is	no	longer	part	of	my	bicycle	just	begs	the	question	against	
my	proposal.	Without	some	independent	reason	to	think	that	the	bell	is	no	longer	part	
of	my	bicycle	we	should	not	accept	this	as	a	counterexample.		
	
There	 is	 something	 else	 to	 be	 careful	 of.	When	 you	 think	 about	 the	 situation	 that	 I	
have	described	you	might	be	adding	some	features	that	would	very	naturally	be	part	
of	 such	 a	 situation	 but	 that	 I	 haven’t	 actually	 specified.	 If	 such	 a	 thing	 actually	 did	
happen	 to	my	bell,	 I	might	well	 decide	 that	 it	 is	 no	 longer	part	of	my	bicycle,	 albeit	
subconsciously	and	very	quickly.	After	all,	what	would	be	the	point	of	maintaining	that	
it	 is	 still	 part	 of	 my	 bicycle,	 given	 that	 it’s	 never	 to	 be	 seen	 again?	 You	 might	 be	
imagining	that	to	be	part	of	the	situation,	because	it	would	be	a	very	natural	thing	to	
happen	in	such	a	situation.	 If	so	then	you	are	right	to	think	that	the	bell	 is	no	longer	
part	 of	 my	 bicycle.	 But	 such	 a	 situation	 is	 not	 a	 counterexample	 to	 the	 second	
proposal,	because	it’s	one	in	which	the	relevant	decision	has	been	made.		
	
7.	Two	other	objections	
	
Objection.	 If	 my	 proposals	 about	 imparting	 and	 exparting	 are	 right,	 then	 we	 can	
change	the	mass	of	some	objects	just	by	thinking.	For	the	mass	of	a	complex	object	is	
determined	by	 the	mass	of	 its	parts.	According	 to	my	proposals,	we	 can	 change	 the	
parts	of	an	object	just	by	thinking	(by	making	appropriate	decisions).	And	that	means	
that	 we	 can	 change	 its	 mass	 just	 by	 thinking.	 But	 we	 can’t	 change	 the	mass	 of	 an	
object	just	by	thinking.	So	my	proposals	are	not	right.	
	
Reply.	It	depends	on	what	extra	conditions	are	required	for	imparting	and	exparting.	If	
imparting	 x	 to	 y	 also	 requires	 attaching	 x	 to	 y,	 and	 exparting	 x	 from	y	 also	 requires	
detaching	 x	 from	y,	 then	we	 cannot	 change	 the	parts	of	 something	 just	by	 thinking,	
and	 so	we	 cannot	 change	 the	mass	 of	 something	 just	 by	 thinking.	 But	 I’m	 skeptical	
whether	attaching	and	detaching	are	required.	I’m	inclined	to	think	that	a	decision	can	
be	sufficient.	If	so,	then	I	bite	the	bullet	on	this	objection.	But	then	I	would	think	of	it	
as	 an	 interesting	 consequence.	 (Keep	 in	 mind:	 we’re	 not	 just	 deciding	 what	 the	
object’s	mass	 is	–	we’re	deciding	what	 things	are	parts	of	 it,	which	 then	determines	
what	its	mass	is.)	
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Objection.	 If	 my	 proposals	 about	 imparting	 and	 exparting	 are	 right,	 then	 ordinary	
objects	such	as	ships,	bicycles,	cars,	and	so	on,	can	travel	faster	than	light.	For	consider	
my	 bicycle	 in	my	 garage.	 I	 have	 a	 complete	 set	 of	 spares	 in	my	 back	 shed.	 I	might	
decide,	in	an	instant,	that	all	of	the	bicycle’s	current	parts	are	no	longer	parts,	and	that	
all	of	the	spare	parts	in	the	back	shed	are	now	parts.	In	doing	so	I	have,	in	an	instant,	
moved	my	 bicycle	 from	my	 garage	 to	my	 back	 shed	 –	 faster	 than	 light.	 But	 it	 can’t	
travel	faster	than	light	(as	physics	tells	us).	So	my	proposals	are	not	right.	
	
Reply.	 Again,	 it	 depends	 on	 what	 extra	 conditions	 are	 required	 for	 imparting	 and	
exparting.	If	imparting	x	to	y	also	requires	attaching	x	to	y,	and	exparting	x	from	y	also	
requires	 detaching	 x	 from	 y,	 then	we	 cannot	 change	 the	 parts	 of	 something	 just	 by	
thinking,	and	so	we	cannot	change	the	location	of	something	just	by	thinking.	But	if	a	
decision	can	be	sufficient	then	I	bite	the	bullet	on	this	objection	too,	and	take	it	to	be	
an	interesting	consequence.	(Keep	in	mind:	none	of	the	parts	travel	faster	than	light,	
and,	as	far	as	I	can	tell,	no	information	does	either.)		
	
8.	Application	to	the	puzzle	
	
Now	back	to	the	puzzle.	Recall	that	to	figure	out	which	ship,	at	the	end	of	the	process,	
is	 the	 original	 ship	 we	 just	 need	 to	 figure	 out,	 each	 time	 a	 plank	 gets	moved	 from	
location	A	to	location	B,	whether	it	 is	still	a	part	of	the	original	ship	and,	each	time	a	
new	plank	gets	moved	 to	 location	A,	whether	 it	becomes	a	part	of	 the	original	 ship.	
That	 is,	we	 just	need	to	figure	out,	each	time	a	plank	gets	moved	from	location	A	to	
location	B,	whether	it	is	exparted	from	the	original	ship	and	to	figure	out,	each	time	a	
new	plank	gets	moved	to	location	A,	whether	it	is	imparted	to	the	original	ship.	
	
I	have	proposed	necessary	and	 sufficient	 conditions	 for	an	 imparting	or	exparting	 to	
occur.	According	to	this	proposal:	
	
When	a	plank	is	moved	from	location	A	to	location	B	it	is	exparted	from	the	original	
ship	 if	and	only	 if	 there	 is	a	z	such	that	z	decides	that	the	plank	 is	not	part	of	the	
original	ship	and	CE(the	plank,	the	original	ship,	z)	
	
When	a	new	plank	is	moved	to	 location	A	it	 is	 imparted	to	the	original	ship	 if	and	
only	if	there	is	a	z	such	that	z	decides	that	the	plank	is	part	of	the	original	ship	and	
CI(the	plank,	the	original	ship,	z)	
	
Recall	that	CE(the	plank,	the	original	ship,	z)	are	whatever	conditions	are	required,	in	
addition	to	the	appropriate	decision,	for	an	exparting	to	occur.	These	include:	z	having	
the	appropriate	authority	over	both	the	plank	and	the	original	ship,	there	not	being	a	
trumping	decision,	and	perhaps	other	things.	And	CI(the	plank,	the	original	ship,	z)	are	
whatever	 conditions	 are	 required,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 appropriate	 decision,	 for	 an	
imparting	to	occur,	which	include	similar	things.	
	
Whether	 these	 conditions	 are	 satisfied	 is	 what	 determines	 what	 expartings	 and	
impartings	take	place,	and	thus	which	planks	belong	to	the	original	ship	at	the	end	of	
the	process,	and	thus	where	the	original	ship	is	at	the	end	of	the	process.	
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Suppose	 that	 the	 process	 is	 undertaken	 by	 a	 single	 person,	 the	 custodian	 of	 the	
original	ship,	who	has	the	appropriate	authority	over	the	original	ship	and	over	all	of	
the	planks	to	perform	whatever	expartings	and	 impartings	she	pleases.	Suppose	that	
there	 is	no	one	else	 involved	who	might	make	trumping	decisions.	And	suppose	that	
any	other	conditions	 in	CE	and	CI	are	satisfied.	Then	what	expartings	and	 impartings	
occur	comes	down	to	what	decisions	the	custodian	makes	during	the	process.	
	
Suppose	that	she	decides,	each	time	she	moves	a	plank	from	location	A	to	location	B,	
that	 it	 is	not	a	part	of	the	original	ship,	and	that	she	decides,	each	time	she	moves	a	
new	plank	to	 location	A,	 that	 it	 is	a	part	of	 the	original	ship.	Then,	at	 the	end	of	 the	
process,	it	is	all	and	only	the	planks	at	location	A	that	belong	to	the	original	ship,	and	
the	original	ship	is	at	location	A.	The	original	ship	has	been	fully	refurbished.	
	
Suppose	 that	 she	 does	not	 decide,	 each	 time	 she	moves	 a	 plank	 from	 location	A	 to	
location	B,	that	it	is	not	a	part	of	the	original	ship,	and	that	she	does	not	decide,	each	
time	she	moves	a	new	plank	to	location	A,	that	it	is	a	part	of	the	original	ship.	Then	no	
expartings	or	 impartings	occur	during	the	process,	and	so,	at	the	end	of	the	process,	
the	original	 ship	has	exactly	 the	same	planks	as	 it	 started	with,	which	are	now	all	at	
location	 B,	 and	 so	 the	 original	 ship	 is	 at	 location	 B.	 The	 original	 ship	 has	 been	
disassembled,	moved,	and	reassembled	at	location	B.	
	
Suppose	that	she	decides,	each	time	she	moves	a	plank	from	location	A	to	location	B,	
that	 it	 is	not	a	part	of	 the	original	ship,	and	that	she	does	not	decide,	each	time	she	
moves	a	new	plank	to	location	A,	that	it	is	a	part	of	the	original	ship.	Then	the	original	
ship	has	all	of	its	planks	exparted	but	has	no	new	planks	imparted,	so	at	the	end	of	the	
process	it	has	no	planks	at	all,	so	at	the	end	of	the	process	it	is	nowhere	(perhaps	it	no	
longer	exists).			
	
Suppose	 that	 she	does	 not	 decide,	 each	 time	 she	moves	 a	 plank	 from	 location	A	 to	
location	B,	that	it	is	not	a	part	of	the	original	ship,	and	that	she	decides,	each	time	she	
moves	a	new	plank	to	location	A,	that	it	is	part	of	the	original	ship.	Then	no	planks	are	
exparted	from	the	original	ship	but	all	of	the	new	planks	are	imparted	to	it.	So,	at	the	
end	of	the	process,	all	of	the	planks	are	a	part	of	the	original	ship,	and	the	original	ship	
is	partly	at	location	A	and	partly	at	location	B.	This	case	is	a	bit	weird	–	what	seems	to	
be	two	distinct	ships,	one	at	 location	A	and	one	at	 location	B,	 is	actually	 just	a	single	
ship	 partly	 at	 each	 location.	 Weird,	 but	 not	 impossible.	 (To	 help	 see	 that	 this	 is	
possible,	 consider	 the	 following	 variant	 case.	 Consider	 a	 car	 that	has	 a	 spare	wheel.	
The	 spare	wheel	 is	 part	 of	 the	 car,	 and	 is	 carried	 around	with	 it.	 Now	 add	 a	 spare	
muffler,	which	is	now	part	of	the	car	and	also	carried	around	with	it.	Now	add	a	spare	
seat,	a	spare	brake,	a	spare	engine,	and	so	on,	until	we	have	a	complete	set	of	spares,	
which,	to	make	it	easy	to	carry	all	of	these	spares,	we	assemble	and	tow	along.	What	
looks	 like	 two	 cars,	 one	 towing	 the	 other,	 is	 just	 a	 single	 car,	 part	 of	 which	 is	 a	
complete	set	of	spares.)	
	
Other	 combinations	of	 decisions	 are	possible,	 but	 it	 should	be	 clear	 enough	by	now	
what	the	result	is	in	each	case.		
	
So	that’s	my	proposed	new	solution	to	the	puzzle.	
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9.	Two	final	thoughts	
	
At	the	moment	I	only	intend	my	proposals	about	imparting	and	exparting	to	apply	to	
artifacts	–	they	give	necessary	and	sufficient	conditions	for	something	to	be	imparted	
to	 an	 artifact,	 and	necessary	 and	 sufficient	 conditions	 for	 something	 to	 be	 exparted	
from	an	artifact.	What	about	non-artifacts?	Consider	a	 tree.	What	does	 it	 take	 for	a	
leaf,	say,	to	be	imparted	to	a	tree?	And	what	does	it	take	for	a	leaf	to	be	exparted	from	
a	 tree?	Are	 the	 conditions	 the	 same	 as	 the	 ones	 that	 I	 have	 proposed	 for	 artifacts?	
That	doesn’t	seem	right	–	trees	had	leaves	as	parts	long	before	anyone	was	around	to	
make	 any	 decisions	 about	 parthood.	 But	 if	 imparting	 a	 leaf	 to	 a	 tree	 required	 a	
decision	then	those	leaves	could	never	have	become	parts	of	those	trees.	But	maybe	it	
is	 right?	Maybe	 trees	did	not	have	 leaves	as	parts	until	we	 came	along	and	decided	
them	 to	 be	 parts.	 I’m	 a	 little	 nervous	 about	 this	 idea,	 but	 it	 strikes	 me	 as	 worth	
considering.	Perhaps	my	proposals	apply	to	everything,	artifact	or	not.	
	
Confining	 our	 attention	 to	 artifacts,	 there	 is	 an	 interesting	 question	 of	 when	 some	
things	 compose	 an	 artifact	 (often	 called	 the	 ‘special	 composition	 question’).	 On	my	
desk	right	now	there	is	a	mug	and	a	plate.	Is	there	also	a	thing	that	they	compose?	This	
would	require	the	mug	to	be	a	part	of	it	and	the	plate	to	be	a	part	of	it,	which	would	
require	the	mug	to	have	been	imparted	to	it	and	the	plate	to	have	been	imparted	to	it,	
which	would	 require,	 according	 to	my	proposals,	 someone	 to	have	decided	 that	 the	
mug	is	part	of	 it	and	that	the	plate	is	part	of	 it.	 If	no	such	decisions	have	been	made	
then	neither	the	mug	nor	plate	are	part	of	it,	which	means	that	the	mug	and	plate	do	
not	 compose	 it,	 so	 there	 is	 no	 thing	 that	 the	 mug	 and	 plate	 compose.	 But	 if	 such	
decisions	have	been	made	then	there	might	be.	Note	that	it	would	be	very	easy	for	me	
to	 make	 these	 decisions,	 thereby	 making	 it	 the	 case	 that	 the	 mug	 and	 the	 plate	
compose	something,	which	is	perhaps	why	we	are	so	puzzled	about	whether	there	is	
something	that	they	compose.		
		
